ABSTRACT Personal health record (PHR) is a patient-centric model of health information exchange, which greatly facilitates the storage, access, and share of personal health information. In order to share the valuable resources and reduce the operational cost, the PHR service providers would like to store the PHR applications and health information data in the cloud. The private health information may be exposed to unauthorized organizations or individuals since the patient lost the physical control of their health information. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcryption is a promising solution to design a cloud-assisted PHR secure sharing system. It provides fine-grained access control, confidentiality, authenticity, and sender privacy of PHR data. However, a large number of pairing and modular exponentiation computations bring heavy computational overhead during designcryption process. In order to reconcile the conflict of high computational overhead and low efficiency in the designcryption process, an outsourcing scheme is proposed in this paper. In our scheme, the heavy computations are outsourced to ciphertext transformed server, only leaving a small computational overhead for the PHR user. At the same time, the extra communication overhead in our scheme is actually tolerable. Furthermore, theoretical analysis and the desired securing properties including confidentiality, unforgeability, and verifiability have been proved formally in the random oracle model. Experimental evaluation indicates that the proposed scheme is practical and feasible.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of cloud computing, a large number of companies and individuals utilize the public cloud to store and share data. By outsourcing data in the cloud, the users no longer need to maintain the local storage. Instead, users can store the data in a pay-per-use manner and save the cost of hardware and software deployment. Taking Personal Health Record (PHR) system for example, many PHR services are outsourced to the cloud server to enjoy the benefits of cloud computing. The users can access their PHR data from cloud rather than from the PHR service providers.
Undoubtedly, the cloud-assisted PHR system attracts a lot of attention from government and industry. However, it brings a series of questions about security and privacy of the sensitive personal health information of the patients. An unauthorized user may access or modify the PHR data stored in the cloud server. On the other hand, the PHR data collected from patients might be polluted if the malicious adversary delivers the false data to the PHR service provider. Therefore, the most crucial question is how to ensure the PHR data is only available to the users who are authorized by the PHR owner. And how to ensure the data collected from patients is authentic without disclosing the identity of the patients.
Recently, Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [1] has gotten widespread attention in the research community. It realizes fine-grained access control and converts one-toone communication mode into one-to-many communication modes. Moreover, it can effectively ensure the confidentiality of data. There are two types of ABE, named as key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [2] , [3] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [4] , [5] , respectively. In the KP-ABE scheme, attribute set is used to annotate the ciphertexts and access policies are associated with users' private keys. In the CP-ABE scheme, each ciphertext is associated with an access policy, and each user's private key is associated with attribute set. Only when the attribute set satisfies the access policy, the corresponding ciphertext can be decrypted. Similarly, Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) [6] also attracts extensive attention for its ability to sign a message without revealing the identity of the signer. In ABS, a signer who possesses a set of attributes from the authority can sign a message with a predicate that satisfies his attributes. The signature reveals no more than the fact that a single user with some sets of attributes satisfying the predicate has attested to the message.
In order to achieve the confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously, an efficient and flexible method named as Attribute-Based Signcryption (ABSC) [7] . Indeed, ABSC has been applied to secure cloud-assisted PHR system due to its unique characteristics. Although ABSC is a promising security solution to PHR applications, almost all ABSC schemes require a large number of bilinear pairing operations which bring high computational cost on the user side. In addition, the plaintext is signcrypted and uploaded to the cloud server in the PHR system. Then, the signcryption operation only needs to be executed once. However, the frequency of designcryption operation is far greater than signcryption operation. Therefore, how to improve the efficiency of the designcryption in PHR system is a key issue. Recently, Rao [8] introduced a CP-ABSC scheme for cloud-based PHR sharing system which provided fine-grained access control, confidentiality, authenticity, signcryptor privacy and public verifiability, simultaneously. However, due to the large number of bilinear pairings involved in the designcryption process, the computational cost of PHR users has increased significantly. In order to decrease the computational overhead on PHR users, a designcryption scheme with outsourcing mechanism is proposed.
Additionally, the design rationale used in our scheme to achieve verifiable outsourcing designcryption is totally different from the existing ABE schemes with verifiable outsourcing decryption [9] - [14] and server-aided signature verification [15] , [16] . In Lai et al. [9] 's scheme, the verifiability is realized by appending a redundant ciphertext of a random message and a special tag to each ciphertext. In the final decryption step, the original untransformed ciphertext is required to be an auxiliary input to verify the correctness of the result returned from the cloud server. And in [14] , the verifiability is realized by the Pedersen commitment [17] associated with the original ciphertext. Different from the existing works [9] - [14] , the verifiable outsourcing of the designcryption in our scheme is achieved by elegantly incorporating the idea of server-aided signature verification [15] , [16] and the key blinding technique [18] . As far as we know, this is the first time to achieve attribute-based signcryption scheme with verifiable outsourcing designcryption. Moreover, the design philosophy behind our verifiable outsourcing of designcryption can be viewed as the sophisticated combination of ABE schemes with verifiable outsourcing decryption [9] - [14] and server-aided signature verification [15] , [16] , which undoubtedly, is novel and different from the existing work.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we present a new Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Signcryption with Outsourced Designcryption (CP-OABSC) scheme in the cloud-based PHR system. As far as we know, this is the first time to equip the secure outsourcing to the ABSC scheme. The design philosophy behind our verifiable outsourcing of designcryptionan is novel. The major computation in the designcryption process is outsourced to the untrusted cloud server. Only constant computation is required to be run on the PHR user side. Moreover, the result returned by the untrusted cloud server can be verified by the associated user. And the extra communication overhead in our scheme is actually tolerable. The high-level description of our protocol is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The main contributions are as follows: 1) Firstly, we formalize the framework of CP-OABSC.
After that, the verifiability for the CP-OABSC has also been modeled formally. The design philosophy behind our verifiable outsourcing of designcryption can be viewed as the sophisticated combination of ABE schemes with verifiable outsourcing decryption and server-aided signature verification. 2) In order to reduce the expansion rate of ciphertext, we utilize a mixed signcryption technology, in which an attribute-based encryption method is used 39474 VOLUME 6, 2018 to encapsulate the symmetric key and a symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the PHR data. 3) We also prove the correctness and security of the proposed scheme and its complexity and efficiency are also analyzed. We further compare our scheme with other ABSC schemes in terms of signing key size, decryption key size and ciphertext size, the computational cost of signcryption and designcryption.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : In section 2, we will briefly summarize the related work about secure outsourcing of attribute-based encryption, attribute-based signature and attribute-based signcryption. In section 3, we will describe the preliminaries, and present the system model and security requirements of CP-OABSC scheme. We propose the concrete scheme in section 4. Subsequently, the security proof and performance analysis of the scheme are presented in section 5 and section 6. Finally, we draw a conclusion in section 7.
II. RELATED WORK A. SECURE OUTSOURCING OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
To reduce computational cost on the user side, Green et al. [18] proposed a decryption algorithm in which complex computation is outsourced to an untrusted third-party and left a small computational overhead for users to recover the plaintext. They utilized a semi-trusted cloud server to transform any ABE ciphertext into an ElGamal-style ciphertext. In addition, the semi-trusted cloud server knows nothing about the plaintext and the user's private key. In order to outsource the decryption computation to a cloud server, a user needs to use his private key to generate a blind key (BK ) and a retrieving key (RK ). The user transmits the BK to the cloud server, then the cloud server returns an ElGamal-style ciphertext to the sender. Finally, the user utilizes the RK to recover the plaintext. However, in their scheme, a dishonest cloud server may return a fake result by replacing the original ciphertext and its tag with another ciphertext and corresponding tag.
To ensure the correctness of the transformation ciphertext returned from the semi-trusted cloud server, Lai et al. [9] suggested a concrete construction to verify the correctness of the transformed ciphertext. In their construction, a component which composed of a real message and a random message is introduced. However, the original untransformed ciphertext is also required to be input in the final decryption stage. Compared with [18] , this method causes nearly double in both ciphertext size and decryption operation cost.
To increase the efficiency of Lai's scheme in [9] , a key encapsulated mechanism (KEM) was introduced in [10] and [11] , simultaneously. Their methods decrease the communication cost and computation cost nearly by half compared with Lai's scheme [9] . Similarly, the scheme in [12] encrypts a message and a random number together. The random number is used to realize verifiability.
Li et al. [13] considered the huge computation overhead at both the attribute authority center side and user side. They presented a new outsourced ABE scheme which not only supporting outsourced decryption but also enabling delegating key generation. In their scheme, the actual attributes and a default attribute are embedded into a user's private key. The computation related to the actual attributes is outsourced to the cloud server and the computation associated with the default attribute is performed by the attribute authority center. Then, the terminal user's private key can be obtained by merging these two parts together. Moreover, the method of outsourced decryption is same as [18] . Ma et al. [14] proposed two ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanisms (CP-AB-KEM). They are the first one to take into account the verifiable of outsourced encryption and outsourced decryption. Furthermore, their mechanisms provide exculpability, which means that the users can't accuse the Decryption Service Providers (DSP) to return incorrect results. Similarly, an outsourced ABE scheme with anti-fraud function was proposed by Xu et al. [19] . Their scheme prevents the cloud server from deceiving the users. The encrypted data can't be transformed without the permit even they meet the access conditions actually. Taking into account the overall efficiency of the system, Zhang et al. [20] and Wang et al. [21] presented the schemes which not only achieved secure outsourced key-issuing, encryption and decryption, but also increased the communication cost at the client side.
Recently, with the development of outsourced ABE, most of researchers have drawn attention to deploy the outsourced ABE technology to reduce the computational cost and communication overhead on user side and authority side. For example, Li et al. [22] applied the outsourced key generation and outsourced decryption to an ABE system which holds the keyword search function. In [23] , Li et al. achieved a highly efficient user revocation by outsourcing both of the computation of encryption and decryption to cloud servers. In [24] , Li et al. combined the verifiable outsourced decryption technique with the ABE scheme which possesses the property of constant ciphertext length. In [25] , Wang et al. achieved user's anonymity and multi-authority efficiently through the introduction of outsourcing decryption technology.
B. ATTRIBUTE-BASED SIGNATURE
Fuzzy identity-based signature (IBS) was presented and formalized in [26] and [27] which allows a user to sign with part of his attributes. In addition, the verifier can check whether the signature is signed or not. In order to obtain the same purpose as IBS, the concept of ABS was presented in [28] . However, neither of these types of signatures take the anonymity of the signer into consideration. Considering the anonymity of the signer, Maji et al. [6] proposed an ABS scheme which based on groups with bilinear pairings and knew the privacy of the signer. Their construction supports predicate which described by monotone span programs. However, it only proved to be secure in the generic group model. VOLUME 6, 2018 For the purpose of constructing an efficient ABS scheme with provable security under a standard hardness assumption, Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini [29] , Li et al. [30] successfully proposed a reliable and secure ABS scheme under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. However, these two schemes only support the restricted forms of signature predicates. The signature length of the above two schemes grows linearly with the size of attributes in the predicate. In addition, Escala et al. [31] proposed a revocable ABS for threshold predicate, which shares a similar efficiency with Li et al. [30] 's work in signing. Recently, Herranz et al. [32] proposed two threshold predicate ABS schemes with a constant size of signature. However, the first scheme requires a large number of extensive computations, and the second one involves O(d 2 ) exponentiations in signing, where d is the upper bound of the threshold value.
Considering more expressive predicate, beyond the previous work in [6] , Maji et al. [33] proposed a general framework for constructing ABS scheme. They showed three instantiations of monotonic predicates which can be dealt under standard secure assumptions. Based on dual pairing vector spaces, Okomato and Takashima [34] proposed the first fully secure ABS scheme to support the general non-monotone predicate. Then, they built an ABS scheme [35] with similar features in the multi-authority settings. Herranz et al. [32] observed that the signature size of all previous ABS schemes grows linearly with the number of attributes. So, they presented two threshold ABS schemes with a constant size of the signature. In particular, the second scheme enjoys the unique feature of supporting large universes of attributes. Although the existing ABS requires a large number of modular exponentiations in signing and the complexity usually grows linearly with the size of the predicate formula in threshold ABS, it is very useful in the private access control, anonymous credentials and trust negotiations etc. applications.
C. ATTRIBUTE-BASED SIGNCRYPTION
The first ABSC was proposed by Gagné et al. [7] with formal security definitions of message confidentiality and ciphertext unforgeability for signcryption in attribute-based setting. In order for users to provide different rights for signature and decryption, signing attributes are separated to decryption attributes. Later, Emura et al. [36] designed an ABSC scheme with dynamic property that allows updating the signing access structures without reissuing users' secret keys. The signature part makes use of access trees whereas AND-gate policies are used in encryption and decryption process. Wang and Huang [37] proposed another ABSC scheme by adopting access trees for both signature and encryption parts. The security of [37] is given in the generic group model and random oracle model. By considering the drawbacks of random oracle model, the schemes in [7] and [36] are proved to be secure in the standard model. Hu et al. [38] suggested a fuzzy ABSC in order to introduce authenticated access control in body area network, whereas no formal security proof for ciphertext unforgeability is provided in existing security models. Ciphertext size in all of these schemes are increasing linearly with the sum of required signing and encryption attributes. Moreover, the number of expensive bilinear pairing computations are also linear to the number of required attributes. Recently, attribute-based ring signcryption [39] and traceable attribute-based signcryption [40] are also proposed respectively. Rao and Dutta [41] proposed an ABSC scheme with the constant size ciphertext using the technique of key-policy ABS. Liu et al. [42] proposed a CP-ABSC for PHR system based on CP-ABE [43] and ABS [33] . However, the CP-ABSC [42] didn't achieve the property of public ciphertext verifiability.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR GROUPS
Let G be an algorithm that inputs a security parameter λ and outputs a tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 , e), where G 1 and G 2 are two multiplicative groups of the same prime order q. A bilinear map G 1 × G 1 → G 2 has the following properties:
1) Bilinear, that is, for ∀g ∈ G 1 , and x, y ∈ Z * q , the equation e(g x , g y ) = e(g, g) xy is true; 2) Non-degenerate, that is, the inequality e(g, g) = 1 is satisfied;
1 , there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ).
B. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS 1) COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN EXPONENT PROBLEM
Taking a bilinear pairing group D = (q, G 1 , G 2 , e) and a distribution of the form
The advantage of adversary A in solving the computational n-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (n-cDHE for short) problem is defined to be Adv
is said to be (T , )-hard if the advantage Adv n−cDHE A
≤ for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT ) adversary A running in time at most T .
2) DECISIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN EXPONENT PROBLEM
Taking a bilinear group D = (q, G 1 , G 2 , e) and a distribution of the form
≤ for all PPT adversary A running in time at most T .
C. MONOTONE SPAN PROGRAMS
The Monotone Span Program (MSP) from [44] is described as follows. Let {υ 1 , υ 2 , . . . , υ m } be a set of variables. An MSP over Z q is a labeled matrix = (M, ϕ), where M is an l × n matrix over Z q and the labeling function ϕ maps every row of M to a literal of
where 1 n = (1, 0, . . ., 0) is a vector of length n. If we set a i = 0 for all i ∈ X 0 , then Eq.(3) can be rewritten as
In addition, a MSP computes a monotone boolean function
D. PREDICATES

Definition 3:
Here we use A to be the universe of attributes. A predicate (over A) is a monotone boolean function whose inputs are related to the attributes of A. An attribute set U ∈ A is said to satisfy a predicate χ (or χ accepts L) if χ (U ) = 1. Here an input is set to be 1 (i.e., true) if its corresponding attribute is a member of U . Otherwise, the input is set to be 0 (i.e., false) if its corresponding attribute is not a member of U . If U doesn't satisfy χ , we denote it by χ(U ) = 0.
Since the predicate χ is monotone,
Assuming χ is a predicate, L χ denotes the set of attributes utilized in χ. Then, the corresponding MSP for χ is a labeled matrix = (M l×n , ϕ), where ϕ : [l] → L χ is a labeling of the rows of M by attributes from L χ .
We define
On the other hand, y 1 ∪y 0 = [l], where U ⊂ A represents an attribute set.
A predicate χ (with its = (M l×n , ϕ)) accepts an input attribute set U by the following criterion as stated in Eq. (4).
Hence,
The following result (which is an analogue statement of Lemma 1) is very useful to present the security proof of the CP-OABSC scheme which will be proposed in section 3.6. Lemma 2: Let χ , U be a predicate and attribute set, respectively. If χ(U ) = 0, then there exists a vector u = (u 1 ,u 2 , . . . ,u n ) ∈ Z n q with
E. LINEAR ALGEBRA Lemma 3: Let M be a matrix of size l × n over a field F and M (i) be the ith row of the matrix M. Then, the dimension of the vector space
, where 0 n = (0, 0, . . . , 0) is a zero vector of length n and rank(M) is rank of the matrix M. It can be seen that rank (M) ≤ l.
0 n . Under this condition, the corresponding predicate consists of both AND and OR gates. 2) If rank(M) = l, then the vector space V = { 0 n }. That is, the corresponding predicate is an AND gate. In our scheme, we utilize the predicates that are boolean functions composed of both AND and OR gates as in [45] .
F. SYSTEM MODEL OF CP-OABSC
The architecture of our scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In our scheme, the PHR owners upload the signcrypted ciphertext to the Cloud Storage Server (CSS) which is assumed to be fully trusted. When PHR users want to access the PHR data stored on the CSS, they must use their own attribute set to verify whether or not it is satisfy the access policy. Moreover, the users need to send a transformation secret key VOLUME 6, 2018 to the semi-trusted Ciphertext Transformation Server (CTS). Finally, the CTS returns a transformed ciphertext. At the same time, the PHR user can verify the correctness of transformation ciphertext, and retrieve the plaintext by its private key and secret value. The proposed CP-OABSC scheme consists of the following algorithms: Similar to [8] , we use a security game to describe the confidentiality of message. There C is a challenger and A is an adversary respectively. 
2) VERIFIABILITY
Verifiability of CP-OABSC scheme is described by a game between a challenger C and an adversary A. The game consists of the following steps: 1) Setup: C runs Setup algorithm to get the PK and MSK . Then, C sends PK to A. Definition 5: A CP-OABSC scheme is verifiable if no polynomial time adversaries who possess non-negligible advantage win the above security game.
3) UNFORGEABILITY
The formal definition of unforgeability is based on the following game involving a challenger C and an adversary F. 1) Setup: C selects a security parameter λ ∈ N and runs Setup algorithm. It obtains the master secret key MSK and sends the public parameters PK to F. EUF OABSC,F (λ) of F is defined as the probability that it wins the game above.
Definition 6: A CP-OABSC scheme is considered to be secure against existential unforgeability, if no PPT F can win the security game with a non-negligible advantage.
IV. CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we first modify the original model of Rao's CP-ABSC scheme [8] to allow the PHR user to outsource some designcryption process to a semi-trusted cloud server. Our scheme applies ''signature then encryption'' and combines with outsourcing technology to the PHR system. In this scheme, both the signing and encryption predicates are represented by Monotone Span Programs (MSPs). Let χ = (M,ϕ) be an access structure, it is assumed that the row labeling function ϕ is injective [43] which is a building block of our CP-OABSC scheme. In addition, we adopt a one-time symmetric-key encryption scheme with key space φ = {0, 1} ι and message space S = {0, 1} * that can be defined as SE = (SE-Enc, SE-Dec). Here, we take the tuple D = (q, G 1 , G 2 , e) as a bilinear group. The remaining algorithms are described as follows.
Setup (1 λ ): The TAA executes the Setup algorithm and selects a security parameter λ ∈ N as input. It adopts the key derivation function (KDF) and uses ι to denote the length of the output of the KDF. Let A be the universe of attributes and g be a random generator of G 1 . The algorithm chooses three hash functions
q and a random exponent a ∈ Z * q , then sets Y = e(g, g) a . For each attribute ω ∈ A, it picks h ω , ν, u , v , η 1 , η 2 , µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . µ ι ∈ R G 1 . Finally, it outputs the public parameters as
KDF, S, A)
It outputs the master secret key MSK as
If a PHR user wants to join the PHR system, he/she needs to apply for the decryption key from the TAA associated with his/her attribute set θ d ∈ A. Then, the TAA runs the DecKeyGen algorithm and takes as input PK , MSK and the decryption attributes set θ d . Then, it chooses a random number β ∈ Z * q . Finally, it computes as follows
The DecKey blind algorithm takes as input a PHR user's decryption key SK θ d and chooses a random number t∈ Z * q . Then, it computes as follows
Finally, it outputs the transformation secret key as
and outputs the retrieving secret key as
SignKeyGen (PK , MSK , θ s ): If a PHR owner wants to join the PHR system, he/she needs to apply for the signing key from the TAA associated with his/her attribute set θ s ∈ A. Then, the TAA runs the SignKeyGen algorithm and takes as input PK , MSK and the signing attributes set θ s , and chooses a random number γ ∈ Z * q . Finally, it computes as follows
So, the signing key for θ s is The algorithm randomly chooses a vector (
and sets α = (ε, δ 2 , . . . , δ n e ), here δ 2 , . . . , δ n e ∈ R Z * q . Next, the SE − Enc algorithm utilizes the KDF to generate a new session key SEK with key = Y ε S 1 tt, where tt is the current time, and computes
Then, it chooses a random number a ∈ R Z * q and re-randomizes the signing key SK θ s as follows
Finally, it computes and outputs the signcrypted message as follows
The ciphertext is published as
Now, the PHR owner uploads the signcrypted file C = (SCT χ e , χ s ) to the cloud server CSS.
Designcrypt user (PK , SCT χ e , χ s , SK θ d ): When a PHR user wants to access a PHR file, he/she sends the access request to the cloud server CSS. Then, CSS sends back the corresponding PHR data of the form C = (SCT χ e , χ s ) to PHR user using SSH protocol.
Once receiving the ciphertext SCT χ e , the Designcrypt user algorithm will be executed by a PHR user who possesses a set of authorized attributes. To verify the signature and recover the plaintext, the PHR user first checks the current time tt . Assume thattt is a predefined time limit for message decryption. If |tt − tt| ≤tt and χ e (θ d ) = 1, the PHR user can verify the ciphertext and decrypt the message. Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
The Designcrypt user algorithm takes as input PK , SCT χ e , χ s , SK θ d . It randomly selects x 2 , . . . , x n s from Z * q and sets
Then, the PHR user can proceed in the following way to recover the plaintext M phr .
(1) After receiving the signature S 3 , the verification is presented by checking whether the following equation holds:
Only if it holds, the signature can be proved as valid. The main calculation process is as follows:
(3) Recover Y ε with the following formula
,E 1 )
. The main calculation process is as follows:
, E 1 )
Finally, the PHR user can obtain the correct plaintext with the following algorithm SE-Dec(SEK d, E 2 ) = M phr .
SignVerify out (PK , TSK θ s , SCT ): Firstly, the PHR user re-randomizes the transformation secret key TSK θ s as follows:
Then, the PHR user recalculates the signature S 3 = S 3 s . Besides, he/she selects a secret value t ∈ R Z * q , and keeps it by himself/herself. Finally, he/she deliveries the transformation signature TS 3 = S 3 · g t to the cloud server CTS.
The SignVerify out algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK and the partial ciphertext SCT = (TS 3 , TS 2 , E 1 , S 1 ). Since
s (where T = γ s + a ). Then, the CTS can calculate the verification result VR by the following formula: , g) t Finally, the CTS returns the verification result VR = Y s · e(g, g) t to the corresponding PHR user.
The Decrypt out algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK , the transformation secret key TSK θ d , the partial ciphertext E 1 and E 2 . Then, the cloud server CTS calculates the transformed ciphertext TCT by the following formula 
V. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 1 (Confidentiality): Suppose the security of Rao's scheme in [8] is guaranteed, then the proposed scheme is secure.
Proof: Assume an adversary A with non-negligible advantage can attack the above CP-OABSC scheme. Similarly, the scheme in [8] can also be attacked by an algorithm S with non-negligible advantage.
Let C be the challenger associated with algorithm S in the selectively CPA-secure game of Rao's scheme in [8] . S runs A to execute the following steps.
1) Setup: C executes Setup algorithm in [8] to get the public parameters
and sends it to S. Also, S runs Setup algorithm in this paper to get the public parameters
Finally, it gives PK to A. 
If the entry which satisfies the query exits, S returns TSK θ d ; otherwise, S chooses a random exponent t ∈ Z * q and sets
in the view of the data owner, it is similar between cloud computing center and users. Finally, S will store the entry (θ d , * , SK θ d , * ) in R and return TSK θ d to A. 3) Challenge Phase: A sends S the challenge access structure χ * e . Then, S picks two (equal length) messages m 0 , m 1 and sends them to C to obtain a challenge ciphertext SCT χ e = (χ e , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , tt) by running Signcrypt algorithm of [8] . Finally, S sends SCT χ e to A as its challenge ciphertext. 4) Query Phase 2: A requests a second series of queries, S answers these queries in the same way as it simulated in Query Phase 1, and returns the answer as Query Phase 1. 5) Guess: A outputs its guess b. S also outputs b. According to the above discussion, if A can attack our CP-OABSC scheme in the selectively CPA-secure model with non-negligible advantage. Similarly, A can attack the scheme in [8] .
Theorem 2: (Verifiability) In a prime order bilinear group, if the DL assumption still holds, the proposed scheme is verifiable.
Proof: Suppose a PPT A can attack the verifiability of our proposed CP-OABSC scheme with non-negligible advantage, we can simulate an algorithm S to solve the DL problem in the prime order bilinear group system with non-negligible advantage.
A tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 , e, g, β = g x ) is given to S and S wants to calculate x = log g β. So, S interacts with A as follows:
, ν, µ 0 , u , v , and picks a KDF and a deterministic collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z * q .
Then, S sets the public parameters as: 
Because of the property of KDF, with overwhelming probability, SEK * = SEK * . Since H is a deterministic collision-resistant hash function, with overwhelming probability,
as the solution for the DL assumption.
Theorem 3: (Unforgeability) The CP-OABSC scheme in this paper is unforgeable under the assumption of CDH.
Proof: Suppose an adversary F can break the scheme of this paper with non-negligible advantage, then an algorithm B can be built to solve the CDH problem. Given {g, g x , g y } as a random CDH instance, the purpose of B is to output g xy such that x, y are selected from Z * q at random. 1) Setup: The algorithm B sets (g 1 
According to our setting,
can be calculated as the solution of the given CDH instance.
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the performance of several existing ABSC schemes [8] , [36] TABLE 1 and TABLE 2 show that our CP-OABSC is an efficient and expressive scheme supporting more generic policies which are desirable in practical applications. Similar to our scheme, the schemes in [8] and [42] adopt monotone span programs, and its expression is rich. Most of the previous works [38] - [40] '' [13] + [46] '' adopt the threshold policy as their access structure which is only a coarse-grained level and supports only simple predicates. While the schemes in [36] and [37] support monotone tree policy, the construction of this kind of policy is a little more complex. And the scheme in [41] adopts LSSS-realizable monotone access structure that is significantly more efficient than existing ABSC schemes in terms of computation cost and ciphertext size. Since we consider the fact that some attributes may appear more than once in the access structure which is not taken into account by previous works [36] - [40] '' [13] + [46] ''. The size of signing key and decryption key grow linearly with the number of attributes (must be used in signing or decryption). But, both the signing key and decryption key sizes are less than others if the number of attributes are small. On the other hand, it is obvious that the designcryption cost of our scheme is less than those in [8] , [36] - [40] '' [13] + [46] '' [41] , [42] .
The data in TABLE 1 and TABLE 2 is obtained through simulation experiment. As for the comparison of computation efficiency, our experiment was conducted on an Intel i7 − 6700 processor with 2.53GHz and 8GB memory running 64 − bit Windows 10 operation system. For the overall security of our algorithm, we used SHA − 3 as a hash function. Then, we implemented our experiment in VC++ 6.0 with Stanford Pairing-Based Crypto (PBC) library [47] , and set the size of G 1 and Z q to 64B(512bits). As well as, we set the size of G 2 to 128B (1024bits). In addition, the bilinear map is discussed in section 3.1 and the type A bilinear pair is adopted [47] . So, we used the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x defined on providing ECC group. With the above setting, we obtain the results that a pairing operation costs 96.2ms; an exponentiation operation in G 1 and G 2 costs 53.85ms and 30.6ms, respectively.
As expected, the experimental results demonstrate that our scheme largely eliminates the designcryption overhead for PHR users. As shown in the following figures, Fig. 3(a) depicts the computation time of signcryption on the PHR owner side of CP-OABSC and the other schemes. We found that the time for signcryption increases linearly with the number of attributes, but our scheme still has a lower computational cost of signcryption than the other schemes [8] , [36] - [40] '' [13] + [46] '' [41] , [42] . Observation from Fig. 3(b) demonstrates that the computational cost of the PHR user is much lower than the original scheme [8] due to the verifiable outsourcing mechanism is used in our designcryption algorithm. From Fig. 3(c) , the computational overhead of the cloud server side is much higher since the bulk of the decryption and verification operation is performed by the cloud server. In addition, it should be noted that in almost all schemes [9] , [10] , [18] that support outsourcing functionality. Its communication overhead is always increasing relative to the scheme [1] . As shown in Fig. 1 , the PHR user only needs to interact with the cloud server (CTS) twice. So, the extra communication overhead in our scheme is actually tolerable.
VII. CONCLUSION
To eliminate the computational overhead of the designcryption process at PHR user side, we studied the attributed-based signcryption scheme [8] and presented an efficient and secure CP-ABSC with verifiable outsourced designcryption scheme. With the help of cloud servers (CSS and CTS), our scheme only needs small modular exponentiation operation to PHR user. Thus, the user saves both bandwidth and local computation time significantly. It greatly improves the efficiency of PHR system. Furthermore, we provided the security proof to show that our scheme is CPA-secure. And the experimental evaluation result demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure and practicable.
Despite our scheme has only achieved CPA security, we argue that most existing ABSC schemes [37] , [39] - [41] also can only achieve CPA security. Only the schemes in [7] and [42] are proved to be CCA2-secure. Howerver, the scheme [7] adopts threshold access structure, and its form is relatively simple. Whereas the security in [42] are proved to be insecure in Rao's scheme [8] . So, the CPA security model has been widely accepted in the public key cryptosystem recently. Furthermore, in both of the CPA and CCA2 security model, the adversary can query the decryption key and transformation secret key of any non-targeted user, reflecting that in the real world, the adversary has the ability to collect decryption key and transformation secret key of any non-targeted user. But beyond that, in the CCA2 security model, the adversary can also decrypt any non-target challenge ciphertext. It also reflects that in the real world adversaries can obtain the plaintext information in any non-challenge ciphertext.
To achieve the CCA2 security, one more decryption oracle should be available to the CPA adversary during the Phase 1 and Phase 2. Since the decryption oracle is added to the CPA security model, the adversary can query decryption oracle to any non-challenge ciphertext. Then, the adversary may use a challenge ciphertext to replace a non-challenge ciphertext and perform a decryption query on this ciphertext. In this way, the adversary can obtain the target plaintext, and then the adversary can win the security game trivially. In order to prevent the adversary from partially replacing the challenge ciphertext, the plaintext information is obtained by querying decryption oracle. A common method is to sign the generated ciphertext during the encryption process and perform authentication during the decryption process [48] . Our future work consists of designing efficient and provably secure ABSC scheme, which achieves CCA2 security.
